Mr. Dalton is a highly experienced advisor, team leader, and management consultant. Among the relevant experiences which support his writing on this topic are the following:

The interim government has approved a four-issue referendum question which the President has agreed to place before the people on the same day as the next general election, currently planned for around mid-February 2026. The Referendum question, which the voters will be asked to approve or reject with a single yes or no vote is as follows:

“Do you agree to the July National Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order, 2025 and the following proposals?”

The proposals are:

a) During election periods, the caretaker government, the Election Commission and other constitutional institutions will be formed in line with the July Charter framework.

b) Parliament will become bicameral, with a 100-member upper house whose approval will be required for any constitutional amendment. Members will be allocated proportionately based on the national vote share.

c) Winning parties must implement the 30 consensual points of the July Charter, including increased representation for women, an opposition-elected deputy speaker, limits on the prime minister’s tenure, enhanced presidential powers, expanded fundamental rights and stronger judicial and local government independence.

d) Other reform commitments in the July Charter will be carried out as pledged by political parties.

Voters will respond to all four items through a single “yes” or “no.”

My first reaction was to consider the proposed charter referendum from both a procedural, legal perspective, emphasizing its inherent flaws, and also to examine the content of individual charter proposals that seemed too insignificant to be included in a Constitution. However, after due consideration, I determined that I have neither right nor reason, as a foreign resident, to criticize what six reform commissions and a National Consensus Commission have deemed necessary in order for Bangladesh to return to the rule of law and establish a constitutional foundation for good governance. From a substantive perspective there is nothing so egregious in the Charter, nor in the referendum question itself, which is contrary to those aspirations. 

Therefore, it is only fair and right to applaud the effort and acknowledge the good intentions of all the commissioners (reform and consensus) involved. 

I do wonder, however, why more emphasis was not allocated to (i) the role of women, (ii) protecting the environment through harsh penalties for polluters, (iii) empowering local governments and (iv) as was done in the Philippines, spelling out the revenue sharing formula so that real, legitimate local governments - cities, municipalities, and unions – are guaranteed funds to improve local services for education, health, public markets, rural roads, water and waste water, and a host of other technical and administrative matters. Maybe that will come later.

These policy and fiscal equity gaps are among the reasons why I propose an intentionally longer, ten-year reform period, as described below.

The Flaws

According to international best practice, as well as Article 142 of the Bangladesh Constitution, the first line of any referendum question which proposes to amend the Constitution MUST alert the voters that they are voting to change the highest law of the land, the National Constitution. 

“Section 142 (1)(a)(i) states: “no Bill or such amendment shall be allowed to proceed unless the long title thereof expressly states that it will amend a provision of the Constitution”.

The requirements of both a “Bill” – which is a produce of Parliament – and the importance of adequate notice are missing in the current referendum question, provided above. While a notice could be added by the EC, the requirement for a Bill seems to raise some doubt about whether the authority for a referendum  exists under the law. 

Perhaps the oversight about notice is intended to deflect attention away from Section 142 (1) (a) (ii) which states: “no such Bill shall be presented to the President for assent unless it is passed by the votes of not less than two thirds of the members of Parliament.” This provision of law would suggest that the President must WAIT for Parliament to be sworn in and follow the usual internal procedures before a Bill is passed by 2/3 majority in Parliament and presented to the President for assent. On matter affecting the Preamble or Sections 8, 48, 56, 58 and 142 of the Constitution, the President will order a referendum to determine the will of the people before “assenting” to a Bill modifying the “basic structure of government”. (see Section 7 of the Bangladesh Constitution).

Finally, the referendum question (part b) is proposing that “Parliament will become bicameral, with a 100-member upper house whose approval will be required for any constitutional amendment. Logically, therefore, as part of Parliament it must follow the legal requirements for Parliament, which dictate (in Section 142) that a “bill” related to a Constitutional question must be approved by a supermajority -2/3 vote of the members of Parliament - before it can be sent to the President for assent. Section 19 ( e) states: “Any bill relating to the amendment of the Constitution must be passed by a simple majority in the Upper House”. So, each House (Charter Section 17 designates the Lower House as the National Parliament and the Upper House as the Senate, a term never repeated in the documents) will follow a different standard?  That makes no sense. The referendum question adds to the confusion by indicating that “Parliament will become bicameral” , so when Section 142 specifies that a 2/3 super majority of “Parliament” is required to pass a bill related to the Constitution, it is only logical to assume that both houses of a bicameral legislature, individually or in the aggregate, must approve a bill that proposes to amend the Constitution by a super  majority. 

Is it fair to ask why a bunch of unelected individuals sitting as the Upper House/Senate - from no designated constituency -get any say at all in a Constitutional matter?  I am sure the answer lies somewhere deep in the socio-cultural heritage of Bangladesh and will be addressed before the country goes too far down this winding road.  

The logical conclusion: a bit more work is needed on the charter and the referendum question before it can be aid to conforms to existing law.

To salvage something positive from the enormous effort in 2025, I used the time-honored 3T analysis approach - THINGS TAKE TIME - to align with the following standards:

“A Constitution is a set of fundamental legal-political rules that:

Are binding on everyone in the State, including ordinary law-making institutions;

Concern the structure and operation of the institutions of government, political principles and the rights of citizens;

Are based on widespread public legitimacy;

Are intentionally harder to change than ordinary law (e.g., a two thirds majority vote on a referendum is needed); and,

Meets the internationally recognized criteria of a democratic system in terms of representation and human rights.”1

So then, what is a Charter? Historically – from the Magna Carta to today – a charter is a grant of rights and powers/duties and obligations from a higher authority to another entity over which it has some control. However, and in the case of Bangladesh this is the key point, in recent times a charter may be prepared by “the subject” of the charter to claim authority, to self-empower, to assert agency. The people themselves become the sovereign power that demands their rights and powers.  How can this be accomplished? Via a referendum in which the people instruct the Parliament to amend the Constitution and adopt other laws which would give practical meaning to the July uprising. This appears to be the quick and dirty; fast and furious intent of sections c and d of the referendum question, which is not a 3T approach at all.

The interim government’s intent, as reflected in the referendum Question, to instruct a future Parliament, rather than advise it, takes the charter provisions deep into the weeds of public administration.  Does Bangladesh have consensus? Does mutual trust exist? If not, how can it be restored? 

First of all, even a perfect charter, a perfect referendum, or a perfect election is not reform, per se. Real reform takes real time. Reform is iterative – one reform leads to another- and then another even bolder reform follows. Confidence builds. It takes time! So, if things take time…how long is enough time? I suggest ten years: a Reform Decade (2026-2035). One could also argue that it might take as long to rebuild the fundamental edifices of government as it did to destroy them. Sixteen years, then? Maybe that’s too much time. I think ten years may be a good enough test decade:  but real reform takes real time.

Parliament must be the instrument of reform.  The National Commission knew this, of course, but may have decided to downplay the role of Parliament since the legislative body will have such a profound and dispositive effect on the rationale for a referendum on the charter and, subsequently, on the Constitution itself. The National Consensus Commission acknowledged the central role of referendum under the description for Constitutional change in Charter Issue 3, Amendment to the Constitution, which states “…specific articles, including the preamble, Articles 8, 48, 56, and 142…. shall require a public referendum for any amendment.” Unfortunately, but maybe tactically, the Commission left out the specific legal and constitutional requirement of Section 7 of the Constitution and the Referendum Law of 1991 which specifies that Parliament has the exclusive power to amend the Constitution. Consequently, it is imperative to vote out a bill from Parliament FIRST before you can have a referendum on even a single issue. Choose wisely! The first legislative bills in 2026 should identify a few key priorities. The undifferentiated TO DO list in Sections c and d of the Referendum Question is not a well-planned, rational approach to a legislative session. 

Could the voters navigate this dense, textual forest of the Referendum Questin and know what a “yes” or “no” vote actually meant for them? I doubt it. Which leads to my key recommendations

Urgently a Charter in Brief (5 pages max) should be drafted to reduce the current administrivia in the National Charter 2025 to understandable language. This streamlined document – in the peoples’ language - should be widely circulated via legacy media, social media, all printed magazines and newspapers and also discussed on Bangla language talk shows. Constitutional provisions are not administrative procedures. To propose Articles that are not worthy of inclusion in the Constitution demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of the elevated status of a constitution. To propose itty-bitty minute details about how things will be done are not critical matters of State and undermine the principle that the Bangladeshi Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land.  

For example, if Charter Issue 17, which concerns internal working procedures – the flow of document up and down between the Upper House and the Lower House – for a bicameral legislature is not adopted by Parliament even after the referendum is approved then Charter Issues 10, 12, 18(a) (b) (c), (d), 19(a) (b) (c) (d) (e), 20, 23, and 28 are mooted and nullified since they each do a deep dive into extraneous and irrelevant issues regarding the Upper House. A very common rule for drafting legislation: Do not assume a law upon which to establish a different law.  

Some wok is needed here. 

One of the obvious flaws in the list of Constitutional changes proposed in the July National Charter 2025 is that many of the so-called 30 consensual points (Referendum section c) are mere procedures, or policies, or exhortations to do the right thing, or are  blatantly narrow, self-interested provisions  that and not people-centric. The Charter in Brief should focus on WHAT not HOW. 

For example; Issue 42(b)(5) states: “The Anti-Corruption Commission may make necessary regulations to discharge its duties and functions”.. and the sun rises in the East. Or this one, under Issue 38(5)(c): “The Secretariat of the National Parliament, under the supervision of the Speaker, will provide secretarial support to the (Selection Committee for the selection of the Chief Election Commissioner)”. Really, what about a tea boy? 

The CA – no committee, no commission, no “usual suspects” – should oversee the preparation of the Charter in Brief by retaining a talented young barrister or two (not a judge or a bureaucrat or an academic) to prepare the Charter in Brief document assuring that it is devoid of jargon like ”proportional representation” a term that may be added to the law but is way too complex for the majority of voters at a referendum. KISS.

If possible, the CA’s office may prepare a fast-track legislative agenda for consideration by the Parliament in the period 2026-2027. Carefully selected from all charter issues the CA’s office will select 8 key laws that will lead to Constitutional amendments and therefore will require a referendum by the end of 2027. In the end there may be only 5 laws that are proposed as bills, but the will of the people could be discerned from such a specific selection. Sections c and d of the Referendum Questions is a complete surrender 

The Ministry of Finance shall be instructed to include in the annual budget for 2026-2027, and annually thereafter, a sum of money for nationwide referendums as recommended by the Election Commission, which amount may not be adjusted except upon final budget approval by Parliament.

I hope these observations lead to positive change. It seems ironic to this outsider that the first demonstration of a commitment to the rule of law is….to ignore the law.