A recent terrorist attack in a disputed Himalayan region, followed by aerial clashes between two nuclear-armed rivals, has sharply escalated an already volatile region into a more tense situation. South Asia stands at a critical geopolitical crossroads, where regional stability is increasingly shaped by complex security dynamics, shifting alliances, and unresolved tensions over a million Rohingyas who have migrated to Bangladesh. The Bay of Bengal—once seen primarily as a trade hub—is now emerging as a strategic flashpoint due to rising concerns over drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human migration routes.  Seemingly, India’s relationships with most of its neighbours have deteriorated, prompting debates over the effectiveness of its regional diplomacy. 

This article examines the geopolitical fallout of these developments, analysing how India’s aggressive posture, its neighbours’ response, and Western perceptions could reshape regional stability.

The protracted Rohingya crisis, sparked by Myanmar’s expulsion of over a million refugees to Bangladesh, has created a multifaceted regional security and humanitarian challenge. Refugee camps have become hotspots for illegal migration, human trafficking, and insurgent activity, particularly by ARSA militants who exploit these camps for recruitment and operations. Cross-border crimes like arms smuggling have surged, further destabilising border regions. 

The Bay of Bengal (BoB) has emerged as a strategic corridor for transnational threats, particularly due to its exploitation by criminal networks linked to the Golden Triangle’s drug trade. Even more dangerously, ethnic insurgent groups—especially in Rakhine—are reportedly using BoB as a channel to obtain illegal arms, compounding regional instability. Diplomatic tensions continue to rise, with Bangladesh demanding repatriation and ASEAN nations divided on refugee resettlement, reflecting the deepening regional impact of this unresolved crisis.

This article aims to explore the root causes behind the growing security concerns in the South Asian region, going beyond the visible threats to examine deeper geopolitical dynamics. While issues like trafficking, armed insurgency, and refugee crises are clearly evident, they may only represent the surface of a much more complex situation. The possibility of hidden influences—such as deep state networks, covert funding, or proxy conflicts—cannot be ignored when assessing the instability in the region. Despite the fact that regional leaders are fully aware of the ongoing threats, such problems continue to resurface, suggesting that the solutions may require a deeper understanding of the underlying geopolitical strategies at play. When we attempt to connect the missing dots, it unravels the complex layers behind South Asia’s unresolved security challenges—revealing the geopolitical rivalries, historical grievances, and strategic miscalculations that perpetuate instability in the region.

While the above-mentioned threats were once seen as purely non-traditional, it’s now clear that they are evolving into more serious, conventional security risks. South Asia is facing a unique and complex situation that demands greater regional awareness and cooperation in the days ahead. Following the pause in Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that any future terror act will be considered ‘an act of war’ against India.   This signals a significant shift in India’s security posture, suggesting that any such attack may trigger a strong and immediate response. The threshold for action has clearly moved, raising the stakes for how terrorism is addressed in the region.

The world believes that India could not provide credible evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in the last terror attack in Pahelgam on April 25. Not a single country made a statement in favour of India’s retaliatory attack on Pakistan soil, except for Israel. Regional forums like SAARC or BIMSTEC members were silent. Even India’s closest friend, Russia, didn’t make any statement in favour of India.  

It’s important to recall that on August 5, 2019, Prime Minister Modi made the decision to abrogate Article 370. This move increased the security risks within India, as many people in Jammu and Kashmir did not accept the decision and promised to continue their resistance. By doing so, India may have distanced its own citizens in the region, and there is a strong possibility that this could lead to backlash in different forms. 

India updated its official map to include Aksai Chin within the newly created Union Territory of Ladakh, following the abrogation of Article 370. This cartographic change provoked a strong reaction from China, which rejects India’s claim over Aksai Chin1 

Soon after the map announcement, India’s External Affairs Minister visited Beijing in an attempt to diplomatically ease the situation, but China refused to accept India’s position and continued to view Aksai Chin as Chinese territory. Subsequently, Chinese forces effectively consolidated control over much of Aksai Chin, reinforcing Beijing’s hold on the contested region.2   

This episode highlights how a seemingly administrative action—redrawing a map—can quickly escalate tensions and lead to shifts in on-ground control in high-stakes border areas.

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The next question is, is the security threshold level raised in the northwestern region of India only? Let’s see what India’s approach is with other neighbouring countries, especially in the BOB region. 

India’s mainstream media, government and analysts declared that India’s all neighbours are hostile, tough, fraught, rogue, dragon, people are termite, through them into the Bay of Bengal, and so on. When India says all its neighbours are hostile that means it may consider taking retaliatory action against  any country in the name of counter- terrorism, which is now considered an “an act of war”. 

After the recent political change in Bangladesh, officials and the Indian media were flooded with disinformation about purported violence against the Hindu minority and the rise of religious extremism in Bangladesh. So, Bangladesh or other neighbouring countries could also face implications from India’s hardened stance on security threats.   Is it the new normal geopolitical situation that exists now in the region? This is a unique situation in the world. While there may be gaps in India’s diplomatic approach with its neighbours, balanced reflection is often missing in media narratives, which tend to portray India as faultless and neighbouring countries as entirely to blame.

It is important to mention here that, according to Techglobal Institute, X has become the breeding ground for misinformation from Indian mainstream media. The danger is that 77% misinformation is found in X. This is particularly done by ultra nationalist groups in India, which are the narratives of right-wing ideologues.   

While India’s foreign policy often highlights the importance of “people-to-people connectivity,” its actions at times appear to align more closely with regime-based diplomacy. A notable example is India’s strong ties with the previous government in Bangladesh. Although India enjoyed a close relationship with that regime, this did not necessarily reflect the sentiments of the broader Bangladeshi population. Furthermore, India currently hosts former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who is wanted by the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal. Despite calls for her extradition, India has shown reluctance to cooperate with Bangladeshi authorities on this matter. This situation raises questions about the consistency of India’s stated commitment to democratic values and its emphasis on fostering direct ties between peoples across borders.

The only regional platform dedicated to South Asian cooperation—SAARC—has effectively become moribund, with little progress or engagement in recent years. At the 2014 SAARC Summit in Nepal, proposals by countries like Sri Lanka and Pakistan to include China as a formal partner were met with strong resistance from India. Two years later, following the Uri terrorist attack in 2016, India used the incident as grounds to withdraw from the planned SAARC summit in Islamabad, further stalling the organisation’s activities. Today, many South Asian leaders observe that while India actively participates in high-profile international forums such as the Quad, SCO, BRICS, G20, and the Shangri-La Dialogue, it shows considerably less interest in revitalising its own regional forum. This disconnect has led to growing concerns about India’s long-term commitment to regional integration and cooperation within South Asia.

Following Operation Sindoor, Prime Minister Modi launched an all-party diplomatic outreach, dispatching delegations across the globe to highlight “India’s commitment to peace and the need to eradicate the menace of terrorism” (Facebook, Modi, 11 June 2025). Yet, in a striking irony, not a single delegation was sent to any of India’s neighbouring countries—not even to Pakistan or China. This glaring omission raises serious questions about the sincerity of regional diplomacy. It seems to suggest that India views its immediate neighbours as inherently hostile or unworthy of engagement, and instead focuses on shaping global opinion to reinforce that narrative. If India’s message is one of peace, it appears increasingly aimed at the world—not at its own neighbourhood, where mistrust continues to deepen.

Later, it was revealed that Modi’s team could not bring a fruitful result; what we saw was President Trump rolled out a red-carpet reception for Pakistan Field Marshal Asim Munir in Washington; Trump made a cryptocurrency trade deal with Pakistan, bypassing India. On the contrary, just one week after the high-profile, all-party delegation led by Shashi Tharoor, member of the Indian National Congress, visited the United States to strengthen bilateral ties, the U.S. State Department issued a stark travel advisory for India on June 16, 2025, warning its citizens of ‘high risks of violent crime, including rape and terrorism.’ The unexpected advisory deals a significant diplomatic setback to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ambitions of positioning India as a stable regional leader—especially given his recent efforts to cultivate U.S. support under the Trump administration.

Recently,  remarks by Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM), Dr. S. Jaishankar, at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York have been widely discussed. His two important remarks are widely quoted: 

1. “Both China and India are rising powers in Asia”.

2. “If the world is to be multipolar,  Asia has to be multipolar”.

The power indicator reveals a stark imbalance in nearly every domain of power. China is not a “rising power”—it is already a dominant global force with a GDP of nearly $17.7 trillion, compared to India’s $3.9 trillion. Its per capita income is five times higher, and its defence spending almost triples India’s. China leads the world in cutting-edge technologies like AI, quantum computing, and 5G, and commands significant influence through institutions like the UN Security Council, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Its vast manufacturing base and trade dominance underscore its global economic clout. Meanwhile, India, though growing steadily, remains a regional player, still developing its infrastructure and global reach. The comparison highlights a crucial reality: while India is rising, China has already achieved. Framing both as equals may be politically convenient, but it misrepresents the geopolitical truth.

Can India ever surpass or beat China on any issues? All South Asian countries now have more economic interactions and interdependencies with China than India. India imports $113bn from China and exports just $14bn to China. 

Also, it is worth mentioning that this preserved Indian economic rise is mainly due to the 

cheap oil purchased from Russia and sold to EU countries. 

In fact, polarisation has to be among the great powers, not India. India is far away from being a great power. Moreover, inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir to Whitehouse is a clear signal to India that India is not the only player in the region. So, what EAM is trying to preach has less merit.

The reality is that no country wants to be dominated either by India or China.  Asian countries:

• Prefer strategic flexibility over alignment;

• Want to preserve autonomy;

• Use issue-based partnerships (e.g., maritime security with India, trade with China, defence with the U.S.).    

The growing rivalry among major powers—particularly the U.S., China, and Russia—has made the Indo-Pacific a strategic battleground, leaving smaller littoral countries with limited space to navigate their own path to prosperity. The intense Sino-U.S. competition, combined with India’s close ties to Russia, has turned the Indian Ocean region into a chessboard for great power interests. These global players often exploit the political weaknesses and fragile democracies of South Asian countries to advance their agendas.

Bangladesh, for example, saw its previous regime remain in power for over 15 years with strong backing from India. Nepal is moving closer to China economically, while Myanmar presents a deeply complex case. Credible reports suggest that China supports both the military junta and ethnic rebels in Rakhine, where India also operates the Kaladan project under rebel-held areas. China’s CMEC and India’s strategic interests now overlap in conflict zones, making the regional landscape increasingly unstable. Solving such layered geopolitical challenges is far from simple and requires deeper, unbiased regional cooperation—something that remains elusive.

India views the Indian Ocean as a zone of strategic importance and takes pride in its role as a regional security provider. With tacit U.S. support, New Delhi has positioned itself as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence in these waters. However, to remain a security leader, India needs credible threats in the region. 

During President Trump’s second term, his focus seemed to be more on economic competi-tion rather than addressing security threats in the Indian Ocean region.

Recently, the UN Secretary-General’s visit to Bangladesh and the probable humanitarian corridor to Rakhine are positive steps that could help reduce tensions in the region. Additionally, reports suggest that Pakistan has been trying to improve relations with its neighbours, including India. At the same time, growing cooperation between Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan in areas like trade and security could further stabilise the region.

So, what’s the significance of improved relationships in the region? If the above trends continue, the overall security threats in the region may decrease significantly. If no real threats exist in the Indian Ocean, India struggles to justify its role as a ‘net security provider’ against China. Without clear dangers, its strong naval presence may look like expansion for its own sake, not a necessity. That’s why some believe India benefits from keeping tensions alive—or even exaggerating threats—to validate its military dominance. If regional stability grows, hardliners argue that perceived risks must be maintained to defend India’s strategic influence, hence, framing every neighbour as a potential adversary.

India never showed any interest in resolving the Rohingya issues, even though PM Modi had a good relationship with the ousted PM Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh.   India continues to buy Russian oil despite Western pressure, citing national energy needs and strategic autonomy. 

The growing cooperation between Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan is indeed a security concern for India. This is primarily due to the potential for a strengthened alliance that could challenge India’s regional dominance and create a more complex geopolitical landscape.

Whenever China wanted to improve its relationship with India, India attached a string of conditions that the border issues needed to be discussed first. Of course, it’s a complex issue and difficult to resolve in a short period of time. So, the Indo-China relationship remained at a stalemate, and hence, the regional harmony and cohesion are unmet. 

In summary, South Asia is undergoing a complex geopolitical shift marked by rising security tensions, strategic hedging, and contested regional leadership. While India aspires to play a central role in perceived multipolar Asia, its foreign policy—particularly its handling of neighbours, border dynamics, and alignment strategies—has raised concerns. The region faces growing uncertainty as non-traditional threats increasingly blur into traditional ones. As China deepens its influence and other Asian nations adopt pragmatic, multi-aligned postures, South Asia risks becoming a flashpoint unless cooperative diplomacy, respect for sovereignty, and balanced regional engagement are prioritised.

A country with world’s largest population of 1.4bn, onus has fallen to India to improve the regional cohesion, of course, not by making the hostile neighbours.