John C. Dalton
He is not affiliated with any organization, the ideas and recommendations are his own, personal observations and recommendations. He is a former State government official, advisor to the President of Liberia, the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, the Anti-Corruption Commission in Zambia, and the Department of Budget and Management in the Philippines, among many international assignments. John has conducted numerous consultancies for funding agencies on public financial management, general management, anti-corruption, and integrity.
“If you don’t know where you’re going any road will take you there”
This paper advances this position: Bangladesh will either be a well-ordered, service- oriented, values based democratic system of governance where power is vested in the people living at the grassroots or it will fail again. The current Unitary State in Bangladesh has failed the population. Accordingly, a Federal Republic will break the iron grip of partisan politics and allow the Bangladeshi population to control their own destiny.
Bangladesh is too big to flail. It is among the ten most populous countries in the world. Yet, it clings to an old colonial structure in which all power rests with the sovereign center. It has a UNITARY form of government, a form which encourage enables, and endorses state capture by the rich and powerful, as we have seen. On the other hand, FEDERALISM is a shared powers system of government, which reserves certain critical powers to the central government, but, more importantly, recognizes the advantages of governments located closer to the people providing quality services.
In a Federal Republic, authority and responsibility may be distributed, as follows:
Powers Reserved to the Central Government
* Defense and National Security
* Foreign Affairs
* Monetary Policy
* Income and Consumption Taxation *
* Trade and Commerce Immigration and Citizenship
* Large, Multi-Jurisdiction Infrastructure
* Authorizing Constitutional Amendments
Powers Delegated by Constitutional Authority
* Wealth and Property Taxation* and Collection
* Education*
* Health Care*
* Small/Medium Scale Infrastructure (financing, operations, maintenance)
* Police/Law Enforcement*
* Water and Waste
* Land Use
* Markets
* Corporate powers (sue, borrow, contract, eminent domain)
May also be shared/designated responsibility for some subfunctions
Figure 1, below, identifies the 10most populous countries in the world, including Bangladesh. Of the top ten countries seven (7) are Federal Republics with a similar distribution of powers (reserved or delegated) as presented above. The population density of Bangladesh (1350/km) is the highest in the world by a factor of 2.5 while the annual population growth rate of 1.22% adds to the burden of a centralized Unitary State to meet its challenges. Bangladesh cannot continue on this path.
The ranking below places Bangladesh among its peers, based on population.
Figure 1. The Ten Most Populous Countries
Note that among the Federal Republics, there are also tailored solutions based on ground reality. For example, Brazil, Nigeria, and Ethiopia have designated Brasilia, Lagos and Addis Ababa, respectively, as National Capital regions to recognize their economic primacy and also to account for the fact that their tax base is diminished by the presence of so many public/tax exempt buildings. One might make the same case for Washington, DC, a special district (District of Columbia) that is heavily subsidized by the US Federal government to offset the loss of tax revenue from so many Federal offices.
The Bangladesh Local Government Reform Commission recognized the unique characteristics of its own Capital City, Dhaka, and proposed a metropolitan “city” which would consolidate several co-existing entities under a single administrative structure. The LGRC also suggested that Dhaka (and Chattogram, too) include currently independent utility services under a single structure. Dhaka, as the nation’s capital, MIGHT be ready for consolidation, but the proposed new “city” in Dhaka and Chattogram attaches many financial losers to an already underperforming City Corporation. This is more like a bailout for the central government than an approach that will encourage improved, coordinated local service delivery. But, if you insist, give it try, provided the funding for these white elephants comes from the central government.
1.0 What’s what?
In one way – form of government - Bangladesh is among the majority. There are approximately 35 Federal Republics, while 150 countries operate under the unitary state principle. Many of the latter are small entities or countries headed by royalty. Some unitary countries – especially in Scandinavia - are among the best in terms of high-quality service delivery to a homogenous population where the social contract is very strong and quite effective.
But as countries increase in population size the logic of distributed power, citizen participation, and fiscal demands for services suggests (demands?) that a power-sharing/burden sharing form of government, seems more effective and needs to be established. Figure 1 above demonstrated that Federal Republics are more prevalent among countries with large populations. Figure 2, below paints a different picture. It shows how the best-in-class, by designated population bands, compare between unitary and federal states, based on GDP.
Fig. 2 GDP for similar populations: best-in-class unitary versus federal republic
countries

Federal Republics take no prisoners. Federal Republics have far and away higher GDP than comparable Unitary States like Bangladesh. Of course, in a true comparative study, there would be a granular analysis of other variables not just GDP. Nevertheless, it seems pretty convincing that when governments give up central control (a feature of Unitary States) in favor of decentralized economic management (Federal Republics) good things happen. And, it could happen in a re-imagined Bangladesh, if the current captured state condition was eliminated.
Anther way of looking at Bangladesh compared to other countries is in terms of tax-GDP. Bangladesh is in a small cluster of LDCs with very low tax-GDP ratios. For example, Bangladesh is a member of four-country cluster of misfits, which in addition to itself, includes Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Haiti, all of which have undergone mass public uprisings. Is Bangladesh the exception to the rule or, rather, a ticking timebomb just waiting for its moment? Was the uprising in 2024 against the political leadership or, rather, was it against a form of government – the Unitary State - that favors the rich and powerful to the detriment of others? I believe it would be an inaccurate misreading of past events to assume that the July/August uprising was triggered solely against one person and her cronies. Rather, I believe it was focused on the broken system of which the PM was its symbol.
I think there is a lesson to be learned by Bangladesh. A low tax-GDP ratio is the canary in the coal mine. It suggests that the citizens disapprove of the government that controls their lives but offers little in the way of benefits, so much so that the citizenry do not feel the need to pay taxes. If the July/August uprising was only about chasing away authoritarian leadership, why have tax revenues decreased under the new regime? Rather, a logical conclusion might be that Bangladeshis love their country and are willing to fight for it, but they hate their government.
So what’s the alternative?
2.0 A Federal Republic for Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a young country. Change is possible, especially when it is designed to raise up living standards through improved services and create greater opportunities for all youth (boys AND girls/educated AND uneducated). It is not as if Bangladesh, has been forged in a cauldron of traditions and culture that has been created over several centuries and shapes the relationships between the government and the governed. Bangladesh is not England, nor the United States whose governance has stood the test of time.
But a cosmetic change will not suffice. And, any reform that depends on the central government as a driving force for change will fail. Rather, as I suggest, the energy for change must be generated from the bottom. Decentralization, home rule and individuals’ right to self government must spring up from the people. With maximum flexibility to guide this energy the CA and other leaders can bring about the substantive change that Bangladesh will require as it navigates toward a more demanding set of economic conditions. A few of the fundamental difference between the current unitary state and the desired form of government based on federal principles follows in Fig. 3.
Fig 3. Comparing the Principal Characteristics of Unitary
and Federal States
Change is imperative. The central government has lost the confidence of the people. It is time to dismantle the current system of centrally controlled subnational administrations and replace it with a more people-centered and cost-effective alternative, especially now when political parties are less likely to interfere.
In addition to the different characteristic between a UNITARY STATE and a FEDERAL REPUBLIC, it is also useful to make a functional comparison:
In a Federal Republic, local means local: citizens in self-governing localities, having pride of place, which they call home, willing to participate in its governance, ready to elect their own leaders, willing to pay taxes and see the benefits of expenditures made to improve their living conditions. The Local Government Reform Commission (LGRC) mistakenly lumped together two deconcentrated subnational administrative units (zilas and upazilas) with three true LOCAL governments, i.e., cities, municipalities and union parishads,). The LGRC calls all five “local” and recommends that elections should be held in all of them. OK, sixty percent (60%) correct. But, No!
Accordingly, the priority focus must be on the three types of LOCAL governments in Bangladesh: cities, municipalities and union parishads. These three are the fundamental building blocks of the decentralized elements of a Federal Republic. Democratic and inclusive governance starts at the base. It starts with the principle of home rule, a power dynamic designed by and for those citizens of Bangladesh who do not want to continue hating their government.
One more time: Zilas (just places on a map, really) and upazilas are led by delegated agents of the central government. Zilas and upazilas are anachronistic and will be abolished under a Federal Republic. As discussed further, Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution must be annulled and replaced by empowering language.
Below, please find a model hierarchy (Fig. 3) for the decentralized components of a Federal Republic in Bangladesh. There could be other models that would also meet the objective of enabling a transition toward citizen-led, participatory grassroots governance for the decentralized elements of a Federal Republic which serves the many rather than favoring the few, as is currently the case. Ok, show me!
Once this fundamental building block is in place, a streamlined central government and a much smaller than suggested Parliament could be rationalized to concentrate on its reserved powers and establish a coordination mechanism at the Provincial level for the delegated powers that will improve service delivery.
Fig. 3: A Model for the Decentralized aspects of a Federal Republic in Bangladesh
The apex structure for the decentralized, locally-based Federal Republic is the Province, enough in number to be consequential but not so many as to dissipate their tax base and hinder area-wide service delivery. Each Province would have no less than four regions, calibrated to the geography and topography of the Province, and supported initially, by deconcentrated staff freed up by the dissolution of zilas and upazilas. A Regional Service Center, as described below, would be a resource – an advisory service - for local governments. It would coordinate with the deconcentrated national agency agents deployed by their respective agencies. Neither the subnational staff nor the provincial staff will be elected officials.
The Bangladesh Constitution, Chapter 3, Articles 59 and 60, is the controlling texts for local governments. Other texts, such as the following, provide additional details about both local governments (i.e., unions and city corporations) and deconcentrated subnational structures (i.e., zila and upazila), which are not local governments:
Key Laws Relating to Local Government
* Union Parishad Act (2009)
* City Corporations Act (2009)
Key Laws Relating to Subnational Units of Central Government
* Upazila Parishad Act (1998)
* Zila Parishad Act (2000)
The provisions of Chapter3, Articles 59 and 60 are summarized below:
Article 59 authorizes the establishment of local government bodies “in every administrative unit”, i.e., under the control of the administrative units established by the central government. Their functional responsibilities include general administration, public order and economic development. Article 60 couldn’t be clearer about the limited authority conferred on local governments by stating that Parliament “confers” powers to local government bodies. “Who’s Your Daddy?” This is just decentralization by domination. A tricky use of vocabulary without any substantive change. And the people know they are being manipulated and dominated.
What is the most obvious and most telling evidence of this?
Well, there are many, but this one has been acculturated for Bangladesh: the near absolute, often corrupt, and disempowering control of the Member of Parliament (MP) in their constituencies and the impunity with which they bring down the hammer. These elected officials, irrespective of Party but most definitely when they have the ace in the hole, a Prime Minister of the same Party, DICTATE land use, public expenditures, favoritism in contracting, etc., etc. etc. Bangladeshi MPs will kill the Federal Republic baby in the cradle unless local governments are given independence and home rule before they are elected. It would be a huge backward step to increase the number of parliamentarians, at least until the superstructure for a Federal Republic has been established, practiced, and stabilized. This suggests, NO ELECTIONS FOR MPs UNTIL 2027. There will be democracy across the land. MPs when elected can concentrate on making laws that address national concerns.
Building from the base in Bangladesh is the only way to achieve decentralized democracy and development. A top-down approach is new old wine in old bottles; rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic; creating the future by putting lipstick on the failed past. You get it. If elections are rushed, reform is dead! If a new Unitary State is created due to a rushed political accommodation – elections – true reform will never happen. It will like a honeymoon in separate hotels – why bother?
So, here’s a plan!
3.0 Locally-Led Service Delivery
Imagine with me a blank canvas called Bangladesh. Currently, it consists of 4573 itty bitty pixels, called union parishads. It can only be with bad intention that they have been established as small, weak, and under-funded entities: fertile ground for manipulation and control. Municipalities (330 pourshavas) and cities (12 cities and at least one mega-city, Dhaka) are firstly pre-placed on this canvas with their current geographic boundaries. They will play a major role in the new system of devolved powers in the independent Federal Republic and are the superstructure for a Federal Republic.
If the powers-that-be agree with the logic that the purpose of reform is CHANGE, I recommend that the CA and his advisors appoint, by June 15, a Boundary Commission (but maybe with, shall we say, youngish and less-bookish members), which would have the mandate to:
1. On a large base map, pin all 13 cities and 330 municipalities. These are the fundamental building blocks, economic engines of both growth and fiscally responsible service providers within a decentralized, constitutional, and democratic Federal Republic.
2. Then, consolidate the current 4573 union parishads into approximately 480 empowered local bodies, large enough to constitute a viable entity capable of self-government. This consolidation must be handled deftly, considering population, the presence of utilities, road networks, topography, presence of an urban center etc. This is not a “needs -based” exercise where the result is 480 equally poor and disadvantaged localities. There will be high-resource union parishads and low resourced union parishads. Equalization grants from the central government and the Province can compensate for the low-resourced. But the over-riding principle for the Commission is “every boat on its own bottom.” (Not that boat, brothers and sisters)
3. Based on the new union parishads layout created through this exercise, classify them according to a few agreed criteria. There could be three classes. Let’s say,
Class 1-solid economic base; and not subject to erosion or environmental degradation; road networks +/- 80% paved; electricity, internet, and clean water are available; public markets are well maintained and revenue producing; elementary schools are within 5 km of population centers; the majority of Class 1 cities are proximate to one city and two municipalities;
Class 2- viable with solid potential but with a weak economic profile (e.g., low level industries or polluters [e.g., leather, brick kilns], road network is 60% paved or graded; electricity, internet, and clean water are available in some spots but there is not full coverage; public markets have poor upkeep and revenues are low and collection not enforced; schools and other public facilities may exist but are poorly maintained and serviced (e.g., no toilet for girls); urban centers are more than 5km from many areas of the parishad.
Class 3 -suffers from prior neglect and poor service availability; industries and jobs are low skilled or non-existent; road network is less than 50% paved or graded; utilities are subject to frequent disruption, perhaps due to severe weather; public markets are unregulated and of the roadside variety with poor hygiene and transport safety; education is undervalued and under-developed; urban services are not centralized and often not available.
After the consolidation and classification has been completed, a color-coding scheme is activated, creating a graphic representation of capacity.
4. Now comes the fun part. Based on this map of all local governments, color-coded to show the overall “capacity” condition of Bangladesh, the Boundary Commission will draw the boundaries for Provinces, the primary decentralized units of a Federal Republic. The target is to create fifteen Provinces, as the apex structure for a service-oriented system of democratic governance in Bangladesh. Provinces should contain enough capacity (refer to the map) as a tax base capable of generating own source revenue. The goal is to have a city in each Province (or at least a cluster of urban municipalities). Let me make the point again! Zilas and upazilas are NOT local governments. Rather they are deconcentrated central government administrators that coordinate top-down central services but with a high degree of control. They will be abolished; administrative funds reprogrammed; and a few staff made available for hire (no guarantee/all on merit in the new dispensation) by the Provinces.
4.0 Elections in 2026
The boundary commission should finish its work by end 2025 and LOCAL and PROVINCIAL elections may be held by half-year, 2026. If necessary, the Provincial elections could follow the local elections, although cost considerations and voter attention span must be considered. A revised, scaled back and more economical strategy for electing MPs (200 seems enough) will culminate in national elections by December 2027. Elections will be held in 2026, for local officials which should satisfy those clamoring for democracy. For those that want control, only filling the current vacuum NOW will satisfy their blood lust for power. Local elections will be non-partisan and focused on purely local matters without being muscled by MPs and their “boys.” A big victory for true democracy.
A logical process for electing local leaders could be based on a 5-7-9-11 approach. Five councilors for union parishads; 7 council members for pourshavas; nine councilors for cities; and, eleven councilors for Provinces. Cities will directly elect a Mayor and Provinces will directly elect a Governor. All council members will be directly elected by the people voting in their respective local or provincial jurisdictions. The Council Chairperson for union parishads, pourshavas, cities and provinces will be selected by the council members unless the citizens demand otherwise.
5.0 Regional Service Centers (RSC)
Since Provinces will be fairly large in terms of population, territory yet fairly limited in terms of start-up capital and capacity (once elected and empowered) it is recommended that an assembly be convened by the Provincial Council to which a single representative from each subsidiary local government would be invited. The primary purpose of the assembly is to identify a small but sufficient number of Regional Service Centers (RSC) to be created for the purpose of offering technical assistance and training on administrative matters and to foster joint development through institutional collaboration. A ward in a city could work closely with an entire abutting union parishad or work with wards from several unions to identify an appropriate shared waste disposal site, for example, or an ice hockey rink (just to see if anyone is actually reading this). Many other intergovernmental partnerships could be created and curated with the assistance of regional service center guidance.
An RSC serves as a lynchpin to help local governments coordinate VERTICALLY with the Province, COLLABORATIVELY with cities and municipalities, and HORIZONTALY among all local governments.
6.0 Assigned Tax Authority/Own Source Revenue
One hundred percent of the land in Bangladesh is located within a local government. Every paki-bigha-decimal-kattah-shotangsho and oujutangsho is either privately owned or used for public purposes (school buildings, health clinics, economic zones, police stations, etc.). In a Federal Republic all land and the buildings located on the land are under the stewardship and custody of the people. The local governments, acting through the peoples’ elected representatives impose a fair, equitable and non-confiscatory property tax to raise the revenue needed to finance local services. Each city, municipality, and union will have the Constitutional authority to tax the property within their jurisdiction at rates that reflect the value of the property. That Constitutional authority to levy a property tax is one of the key differences between a Unitary State and a Federal Republic.
The LGRC proposes property taxes to support decentralization. However, Article 60 of the Constitution would prohibit differential, market-based tax rates for individual local governments. All property tax rates would need to be the same throughout Bangladesh, a nonsense.
Listed below, with a brief description, are the sources of revenue that will be Constitutionally authorized to local governments:
7.0 Revenue Sharing
It may be hard for you to imagine how this fundamental provision of public financial management in a Federal Republic can be achieved in Bangladesh since the country’s finances will be in a deficit position for many years to come. This condition is due to a lack of fiscal discipline and very poor budgeting practices. Accordingly, Constitutional guarantees will be essential to assure that funds allotted to and earmarked for Provinces and Local Governments are transferred in a complete and timely manner. The lesson from the Philippines is not to overcommit. When the government tried to recalibrate the distribution, cities and provinces won a decisive victory in court. What looked like smart politics turned out to be bad policy.
In addition to sharing tax revenues, Federal Republics also use special purpose grants and formula-based equalization grants to supplement the own source revenue mobilization efforts of provinces and local governments. In Bangladesh this will require both a Constitutional mandate and a predictable, irrevocable sharing formula and a floor (real money) for the distribution.
There are choices to be made. For example, a high percentage of ALL tax revenues may be budgeted as revenue to be shared with Provinces and local governments as was done in the Philippines. Or Bangladesh may allocate 15% of VAT and 15% of income tax collections to a pool to be distributed by formula jointly developed between central government and Provincial and local service providers. The amount to be included in the budget may be based on a twelve-month period (January-December), rather than on a fiscal year (July - June) to account for the lag in finalizing financial records.
8.0 Conclusion
“There is a time in the affairs of men
Which taken at the flood leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries;
On such a full sea are we now afloat; and we must take the current when
It serves;
Or lose our ventures”
If Bangladesh does not move now with bold and courageous action, now, there will be misery. From my perspective Bangladesh is teetering on the precipice of fiscal folly and financial disaster. That is precisely why a fundamental change is imperative. Now is not the time to discuss whether the proper attire for a firing squad is a western coat and tie or a local punjabi. The Bangladesh bureaucracy – a club that exists solely for the benefit of its members – will not give up power and privilege without resistance.
Leadership is needed at this moment to transition away form a highly centralized Unitary State to a decentralized democracy that puts the citizens first. The Local Government Reform Commission has done a commendable job of laying out some of the operational improvements needed to institute needed reforms. This paper takes a somewhat more focused and strategic approach that complements their work.
John Dalton brings the following knowledge and experience:
* Chief Researcher, Special Commission on Municipal Home Rule (Massachusetts)
* Director, Office of Local Government Affairs (Massachusetts)
* Senior Consultant on State and Local Government, KPMG (Nationwide)
* Resident Advisor on Regional Budgeting, Ministry of Budget (Philippines)
* Manager on Public Sector Performance Improvement PwC (Nationwide)
* Advisor to 13 US State Economic Development Agencies CD Management Corp.
* Urban and Regional Capacity Building (Sri Lanka)
* Resident Advisor to the Anti-Corruption Commission (Zambia)
* Advisor to the President on Capacity Building (Liberia)
* Advisor to the Prime Minister (Zimbabwe)
* Team Leader on Fiscal Decentralization (Pakistan)
* Team Leader for Capacity Building on Metro Cairo Water Authority (Egypt)
* Team Leader on Decentralization (Ethiopia)
* Principal Consultant on Anti-Corruption in Customs (DRC)
* Technical Lead on PFM Reform Action Plan (Bangladesh)
* Various (Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Mozambique, Tunisia, Palestine, Indonesia, Nepal, Asia-Pacific, US cities: Boston, San Francisco, Atlanta, Indianapolis, Seattle, San Antonio, and New Haven)