The geopolitical tense cloud over this region, the internal complexity of Myanmar, and the uncertainty of Rohingya repatriation have pushed Bangladesh towards a perplexed situation. The objective of Bangladesh is to resolve the Rohingya issue by ensuring honourable, sustainable, and voluntary repatriation of Rohingyas to their motherland, ensuring sustainability of Rohingyas in Bangladesh, ensuring safety and security of locals and Rohingyas, alleviating environmental degradation in Teknaf, ensuring the least impact on the economy, saving the image of Bangladesh, confirming non-naturalisation of Rohingyas into the population of Bangladesh, etc., until they are repatriated. To date, not a single Rohingya has been repatriated to Rakhine; rather, about 113,000 newly entered Bangladesh after the July revolution, and it is a nonstop inward flow. Under these circumstances, the UN proposed the establishment of a humanitarian corridor between Bangladesh and Myanmar/ Rakhine, which drew much attention in Bangladesh. Let us study the characteristics of an already established humanitarian corridor in other parts of the world, and then we shall discuss the feasibility of establishing a corridor between Bangladesh and Rakhine, including likely challenges.

There is no standard definition of a humanitarian corridor, nor are corridors specifically defined under international humanitarian law. Generally, a humanitarian corridor is a temporary, demilitarized zone or route agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders and established for mitigating the impact of conflict on affected civilians, ensuring safe movement of humanitarian aid/essential goods and relief workers to those in need, and facilitating the evacuation of vulnerable populations during/post armed conflict. As per ICRC, humanitarian corridors or safe passages are essentially agreements between parties to the armed conflict to allow for safe passage for a limited time in a specific geographic area. They can allow civilians to leave, humanitarian assistance to come in, or allow for the evacuation of the wounded, sick, or dead. There are certain preconditions for establishing a humanitarian corridor. These are:

The purpose of the corridor must be clearly defined in the agreement between the parties. A comprehensive written agreement is preferable.

There must be a detailed agreement by all relevant parties to the conflict/concerned on the terms of the corridor, scope, use of the corridor (who can enter into the corridor or items that may be carried), defined area of the corridor, protection & supervisory arrangements, timing (operational timing including recurring status, if any), any condition by any party while using the corridor, etc. All parties in conflict must agree to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the corridor (e.g., by refraining from carrying arms).

The agreement is expected to be signed by higher authorities but to be implemented by the troops at the grassroots level. So, details of the agreement need to be known by the ground troops, affected communities, and humanitarian actors in a timely fashion. This is important for the humanitarian actors to decide/prepare how to transport the relief goods or to exit the corridor.

Before establishing a corridor, a thorough analysis of the context and subsequent measures must be taken to ensure that the oppressed Rohingya in Rakhine do not get the opportunity to utilise this demilitarised route as an entryway to Bangladesh.

The corridor must be safe, usable, accessible, and functional. The entry into and the exit from the corridor up to the destination must be safe and secured for the users. If the corridor is used for the supplies, safe, rapid, and unimpeded transportation to the destination and its distribution must be ensured. Freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel must be ensured for their effective functions.

Respect and protect civilians and civilian objects by complying with the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality as per international humanitarian law.

Parties to a conflict may also utilise the agreement of a corridor to deliberately depopulate the area as per their military objectives or for broader political or strategic objectives.

Over the past few decades, humanitarian corridors have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Humanitarian corridors or safe passages can be traced as far back as 1936, during the Spanish Civil War, when the ICRC obtained authorisation to evacuate some of the women, children, and elderly people from Madrid to Valencia. ICRC evacuated about 37,000 Dutch and Indo-Dutch internees and over 1200 Chinese nationals during Indonesia’s struggle for independence in 1946, 1947, and 1948. In 2016, the ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent facilitated the evacuation of more than 25,000 from the conflict zone of Syria to a safe area. Since March 2022, the ICRC has been helping to facilitate the safe passage of thousands of civilians from Sumy and Mariupol to other locations in Ukraine. Safe passage operations coordinated by the ICRC, the parties to the conflict, and the United Nations were conducted to evacuate civilians from the conflict zone of Ukraine in 2022. With these definitions and the examples in mind, let us evaluate the geostrategic scenario, internal complexities in Myanmar, and challenges for Bangladesh.

The Arakan Army (AA) has captured almost all the areas of Rakhine, including the communication hubs, infrastructures, economic centers, road and river network, border posts, etc., and is trying to administer the state affairs. China and India have significant geostrategic and economic interests in the areas currently controlled by AA. Besides huge investments in Rakhine and other economic interests (like the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, Deep Seaport project, etc.), the Chinese opening to the Bay of Bengal through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) falls into this area. The gas and oil pipeline from Kyaukphyu of Myanmar to Kunming/Nanning of China has been operational since 2014 and 2017, respectively. The Yunnan-Mandalay-Rakhine route, which opens to the Bay of Bengal but falls under the area controlled by AA, is more preferable to China than the Yunnan-Mandalay-Yangon route due to economic, political, and security reasons. China considers Rakhine as a key strategic outpost for them. China is in constant touch with AA to get assurance of the safety/security of all its investments in Rakhine.

India was also implementing the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) to connect the mainland and the seven sisters through sea-river-road, which is currently controlled by AA. The AA not only controls much of Rakhine but also the crucial river junction of Paletwa (on the KMTTP route) in Chin State. AA is about to capture Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine. The Sittwe Port is a crucial component of the KMTTP. India Ports Global Ltd., a company 100% owned by the Indian Ministry of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways, has taken over the operations of Sittwe port. India had strained relations with AA due to Operation Sunrise (surgical strike against AA) in 2019 and Operation Leech (operation against AA killing their leaders) in 1998. Recently, India has been engaging with AA to secure its investments in Rakhine. So, the objectives of both China and India would be to secure their respective interests in Rakhine by engaging all the stakeholders, including AA.

The USA, on the other hand, is already involved in the Myanmar/AA/Rohingya issue as part of their strategy on South Asia. The involvement is anticipated to be intensified given the current unstable situation in Rakhine, which goes against the interest of China. Though the Trump administration is yet to fully unveil its strategy towards South Asia (keeping the priority on inward-looking policy), on account of countering Chinese expansion, the focus of the USA on Myanmar/Rakhine will possibly not diminish. Does the recent visit of a few high-profile US delegations to Bangladesh indicate US interest towards Bangladesh-Myanmar-Rakhine-Rohingya? Is it through the establishment of a much-talked-about humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh to Rakhine?

Bangladesh should find an opportunity from this perplexing situation by leveraging the current dynamic geopolitical circumstances. Some questions need to be asked before deriving a conclusion. What would be the aim, objective, and lines of action of the USA, China, and India in Myanmar given the situation that the AA or their representative government, the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG)/the United League of Arakan (ULA), is controlling almost the whole of Rakhine (15 townships out of 18)? How each of these countries is likely to implement their plans or get themselves involved in the affairs of Bangladesh-Myanmar-Rakhine-Rohingya to bring home their respective national interests. 

Is there any possibility of convergence of opinion between China and India in regards to the Myanmar issue and launching a united effort against the USA, should she try to establish a foothold in this region? Will the USA pursue the Burma Act and Rohingya Act vigorously given the current inward-looking policy of the Trump administration? Is the recent visit of UN Secretary General António Guterres to Bangladesh and his proposition of a humanitarian corridor to Rakhine related to the desire of global powers to intervene in Rakhine, or was it a response to Bangladesh’s initiative? Are we meddling in the ongoing civil war of Myanmar? Is the arrest of ARSA commander Ataullah Abu Jununi related to the confidence-building measure with AA and subsequent smoothening of the humanitarian corridor? If we are talking about the establishment of a humanitarian corridor between Bangladesh and Rakhine, both nations must agree on different terms and conditions. Who will be the party to the agreement on behalf of Myanmar? Tatmadaw or AA or both? Will Bangladesh or the UN sign an agreement with a non-state actor (AA)? Will Tatmadaw agree to keep AA as one of the signatories to the agreement? How can Bangladesh respond to the anticipated diverging lines of action of the aforementioned trio (the USA, China, and India) and bring home its aim and objective in regards to the Myanmar/Rohingya issue?

Regarding characteristics of the proposed humanitarian corridor, we should be clear about the following:

- What would be the purpose and scope of the humanitarian corridor? It is said that the purpose of the corridor is to deliver aid to the famine-hit population of Rakhine, especially Rohingya. Besides humanitarian support, will this corridor ultimately help the repatriation of the Rohingyas to Rakhine?

- What would be the size, location, entry, and exit of the humanitarian corridor inside Bangladeshi territory?

- Where will the corridor end in Rakhine? What is the safety/security arrangement of the man and materials being transported to and from Rakhine?

- What are the items that would be transported through the corridor?

- Who will be evacuated (to and from) through this corridor?

- Which international organisation will mediate and operate the corridor? Generally, ICRC did the same in previous instances in different parts of the world. Who will use the corridor on behalf of the International organisations, Bangladesh and Myanmar?

- What would be the security arrangements for the individuals being evacuated/transported, the humanitarian workers, and the aids? How will the movement of said individuals be monitored? What protective measures will be enforced for the man and material in question from air strikes, artillery/mortar shelling, darkness, etc.? How will demilitarisation of the corridor be ensured? How will the speedy and unimpeded movement of man and material in the corridor be ensured?

- How will the adherence to international humanitarian law be ensured?

- What will be the supervisory arrangement of the activities of the corridor, including entry and exit?

- Who will ensure usability, accessibility, and functionality of the corridor up to the destination?

- How will freedom of movement of the aid workers be ensured for their effective functioning?

- What is the guarantee that AA or Tatmadaw will not use this corridor to depopulate Rohingya from Rakhine?

There are other security concerns like the spillover effect of illimitable narco-terrorism in Myanmar, border violation by AA, kidnapping and intervening of the Bangladeshi fishermen’s fishing by AA, arms trafficking to the armed cadre of JSS and UPDF in Chittagong Hill Tracts from Rakhine, etc. With these difficult and challenging scenarios, Bangladesh needs to address all the issues squarely. The ultimate objective should be to bring home national interest at any cost. We do not have any experience with a humanitarian corridor, so a thorough evaluation of every context and potential challenge must be carried out in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders. A national consensus in this regard is needed before embarking on this much talked about issue.