Wednesday November 30, 2022 12:09 pm

The National Security Council is Crucial for Secular Democracy and Rule of Law

🕐 2022-10-25 14:02:15

The National Security Council is Crucial for Secular Democracy and Rule of Law

Last Part

Dr. Jamaluddin Ahmed

Ending the tenure of the Head of the National Security Council
4. The tenure of the Head of the National Security Council will expire under any one of the following conditions:
He/she announced to the Government in writing the end of his/her tenure;
The Government decided, in accordance with the recommendation of the Prime Minister,  that he/she is unable to carry out his/her duties on a regular basis;
The Prime Minister informed the Head of the National Security Council that he/she has decided to cancel the appointment; such an announcement will be presented to the Government;
An indictment against him/her has been filed for a crime that the Attorney General feels that the substance of which, its severity or its circumstance preclude him/her from serving as Head of the National Security Council.

The Deputy Head of the National Security Council 
5.(A) The Prime Minister, with the recommendation of the Head of the National Security Council and with the Government’s approval, will appoint a Deputy Head of the National Security Council. This appointment will not be subject to tender in accordance with the appointments law.
(B) A person is qualified to serve as Deputy Head of the National Security Council if he/she is a citizen and resident of Israel. In addition, the qualifying conditions outlined in Articles 3(B)(2) to (4) apply to candidates for the Deputy Head of the National Security Council, with the obligatory changes.
(C) The Deputy Head of the National Security Council will be subordinate to the Head of the National Security Council and will serve as his/her stand-in.
(D) The tenure of the Deputy Head of the National Security Council will be five years and can be extended for additional periods, as long as the tenure is no longer than ten years.
(E) The tenure of the Deputy Head of the National Security Council will expire under the conditions outlined in Article 4(1), (2) and (4), with the obligatory changes. The tenure of the Deputy Head of the National Security Council will expire if the Prime Minister, with the recommendation of the Head of the National Security Council, announces to him/her that the appointment is rescinded.
Summoning the Head of the National Security Council to Meetings
7. *The Head of the National Security Council will be regularly summoned to every meeting of the Government, the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs and any other ministerial committee or composition of ministers regarding foreign and security affairs. In addition, the Head of the National Security Council will be regularly summoned to every discussion of the Committee of Heads of the Secret Services.

Other Position Holders in the Prime Minister’s Office – Reciprocal Relations with the National Security Council     
8. *The Prime Minister will determine regulations regarding the method of activity of the National Security Council inside the Prime Minister’s Office, including on the matter of reciprocal relations between the Head of the National Security Council and other position holders in the Prime Minister’s Office. These regulations do not require publication on the record or any other public publication.

Auxiliary Units
9. *(A) The National Security Council will be an auxiliary unit in the Prime Minister’s Office.
(B) Despite the aforementioned in the appointments law, the Prime Minister may, after consulting with the Minister of Finance and representatives of the Civil Service, determine through regulations or rules instructions different from those applicable in the Civil Service with regard to organizing and managing human resources in the National Security Council, subject to instructions in the Budget Foundations Law and instructions in the Annual Budget Law. Instructions hereby determined in the rules will be brought to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee for approval.
10. *The National Security Council’s annual budget will be determined in a separate budget clause in the Annual Budget Law. The person charged with administering this budget clause, with regard to the aforementioned law, will be the Head of the National Security Council.

Upholding Previous Laws
11. The instructions given in Articles 1 to 10 do not in any way detract from the authority granted to another body according to law or from the authority of the Mossad and from the authority of the Atomic Energy Committee according to law or the administrative instruction.

Implementation and Regulations
12. The Prime Minister is in charge of implementing this law, and he/she may, with the approval of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, institute regulations and rules, as necessary, with regard to its implementation.
Amending the Basic Law: Government – No. 5
*In the Basic Law: Government, 2001, Article 7 – is void

Transitive Provision
 *(A) The previously established National Security Advisory Team that operated as the National Security Council in accordance with the instructions of Article 7 of the Basic Law: Government, 2001, in its formulation up to the date this law comes into effect will be considered from the day this law takes effect and onward as the National Security Council, as defined in Article 1, and it will be granted all duties and authorities in accordance with this law. (B) Whoever served as the acting Head of the National Security Council just before this law takes effect will be considered the Head of the National Security Council until the Head of the National Security Council is appointed in accordance with the instructions in Article 3.

The Beginning of the Beginning AI in the Défense
We would like to emphasize a few areas where action is necessary because the stakes of the competition are so high: Small countries like Bangladesh have not yet grappled with just how profoundly the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution will impact our economy, national security, and welfare. Much remains to be learned about the power and limits of AI technologies. Nevertheless, big decisions need to be made now to accelerate AI innovation to benefit the United States and to defend against the malign uses of AI.

Ultimately, we have a duty to convince the leaders in the U.S. Government to make the hard decision and the down payment to win the AI era. In America, the buck stops with the President, and AI strategy starts in the White House. We built a National Security Council to confront the challenges of the post–World War II era. Now we need to create a Technology Competitiveness Council to build a strategy that accounts for the complex security, economic, and scientific challenges of AI and its associated technologies. That leadership imperative extends into all critical national security departments and agencies. 

The human talent deficit is the government’s most conspicuous AI deficit and the single greatest inhibitor to buying, building, and fielding AI-enabled technologies for national security purposes. This is not a time to add a few new positions in national security departments and agencies for Silicon Valley technologists and call it a day. We need to build entirely new talent pipelines from scratch. We should establish a new Digital Service Academy and civilian National Reserve to grow tech talent with the same seriousness of purpose that we grow military officers. The digital age demands a digital corps. Just as important, the United States needs to win the international talent competition by improving both STEM education and our system for admitting and retaining highly skilled immigrants. 

Microelectronics power all AI, and the United States no longer manufactures the world’s most sophisticated chips. We do not want to overstate the precariousness of our position, but given that the vast majority of cutting-edge chips are produced at a single plant separated by just 110 miles of water from our principal strategic competitor, we must reevaluate the meaning of supply chain resilience and security. A recent chip shortage for auto manufacturing cost an American car company an estimated $2.5 billion. A strategic blockage would cost far more and put our security at risk. The federal investment and incentives needed to revitalize domestic microchip fabrication—perhaps $35 billion— should be an easy decision when the alternative is relying on another country to produce the engines that power the machines that will shape the future. 

Innovation Investment
We worry that only a few big companies and powerful states will have the resources to make the biggest AI breakthroughs. Despite the diffusion of open-source tools, the needs for computing power and troves of data to improve algorithms are soaring at the cutting edge of innovation. The federal government must partner with U.S. companies to preserve American leadership and to support development of diverse AI applications that advance the national interest in the broadest sense. If anything, this report underplays the investments America will need to make. The $40 billion we recommend to expand and democratize federal AI research and development (R&D) is a modest down payment on future breakthroughs. We will also need to build secure digital infrastructure across the nation, shared cloud computing access, and smart cities to truly leverage AI for the benefit of all Americans. We envision hundreds of billions in federal spending in the coming years. 
When we started our journey two years ago, little did we know what was in front of us. What we encountered was willingness and hope among many friends and allies to get our mission from Congress right to maintain the United States’ advantage in artificial intelligence (AI).  We enjoyed support from U.S. Departments and Agencies. Many of them loaned us resources, including detailing both civilian and military personnel, and dedicated countless hours to help us understand their missions and priorities. Members of Congress and congressional staff worked closely with us to accelerate our government’s adoption of AI for national security purposes. Over the course of the Commission’s work, we engaged with hundreds of representatives from the private sector, academia, civil society, and across the government. We received countless briefings—classified and unclassified. We met with anyone who thinks about AI, works with AI, and develops AI who was willing to make time for us. We found consensus among nearly all of our partners on three points: the conviction that AI is an enormously powerful technology, acknowledgment of the urgency to invest more in AI innovation, and responsibility to develop and use AI guided by democratic principles. 

Part I: Defending America in the AI Era
AI-enhanced capabilities will be the tools of first resort in a new era of conflict as strategic competitors develop AI concepts and technologies for military and other malign uses and cheap and commercially available AI applications ranging from “deepfakes” to lethal drones become available to rogue states, terrorists, and criminals. The United States must prepare to defend against these threats by quickly and responsibly adopting AI for national security and defense purposes. Defending against AI-capable adversaries operating at machine speeds without employing AI is an invitation to disaster. Human operators will not be able to keep up with or defend against AI-enabled cyber or disinformation attacks, drone swarms, or missile attacks without the assistance of AI-enabled machines. National security professionals must have access to the world’s best technology to protect themselves, perform their missions, and defend us. The Commission recommends that the government take the following actions: 
Defend against emerging AI-enabled threats to America’s free and open society. Digital dependence in all walks of life is transforming personal and commercial vulnerabilities into potential national security weaknesses. Adversaries are using AI systems to enhance disinformation campaigns and cyber attacks. They are harvesting data on Americans to build profiles of their beliefs, behaviour, and biological makeup for tailored attempts to manipulate or coerce individuals. This gathering storm of foreign influence and interference requires organizational and policy reforms to bolster our resilience. The government needs to stand up a task force and 24/7 operations center to confront digital disinformation. It needs to better secure its own databases and prioritize data security in foreign investment screening, supply chain risk management, and national data protection legislation. The government should leverage AI-enabled cyber defenses to protect against AI-enabled cyber attacks. And biosecurity must become a top-tier priority in national security policy. 
Manage risks associated with AI-enabled and autonomous weapons. AI will enable new levels of performance and autonomy for weapon systems. But it also raises important legal, ethical, and strategic questions surrounding the use of lethal force. Provided their use is authorized by a human commander or operator, properly designed and tested AI- enabled and autonomous weapon systems can be used in ways that are consistent with international humanitarian law. DoD’s rigorous, existing weapons review and targeting procedures, including its dedicated protocols for autonomous weapon systems and commitment to strong AI ethical principles, are capable of ensuring that the United States will field safe and reliable AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems and use them in a lawful manner. While it is neither feasible nor currently in the interests of the United States to pursue a global prohibition of AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems, the global, unchecked use of such systems could increase risks of unintended conflict escalation and crisis instability. To reduce the risks, the United States should (1) clearly and publicly affirm existing U.S. policy that only human beings can authorize employment of nuclear weapons and seek similar commitments from Russia and China; (2) establish venues to discuss AI’s impact on crisis stability with competitors; and (3) develop international standards of practice for the development, testing, and use of AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems. 
Transform national intelligence. The Intelligence Community (IC) should adopt and integrate AI-enabled capabilities across all aspects of its work, from collection to analysis. Intelligence will benefit from AI more than any other national security mission. To capitalize on AI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence needs to empower and resource its science and technology leaders. The entire IC should leverage open-source and publicly available information in its analysis and prioritize collection of scientific and technical intelligence. For better insights, intelligence agencies will need to develop innovative approaches to human-machine teaming that use AI to augment human judgment. 
Scale up digital talent in government. National security agencies need more digital experts now or they will remain unprepared to buy, build, and use AI and associated technologies. The talent deficit in DoD and the IC represents the greatest impediment to being AI-ready by 2025. The government needs new talent pipelines, including a U.S. Digital Service Academy to train current and future employees. It needs a civilian National Digital Reserve Corps to recruit people with the right skills—including industry experts, academics, and recent college graduates. And it needs a Digital Corps, modeled on the Army Medical Corps, to organize technologists already serving in government. 
Establish justified confidence in AI systems. If AI systems routinely do not work as designed or are unpredictable in ways that can have significant negative consequences, then leaders will not adopt them, operators will not use them, Congress will not fund them, and the American people will not support them. To establish justified confidence, the government should focus on ensuring that its AI systems are robust and reliable, including through research and development (R&D) investments in AI security and advancing human-AI teaming through a sustained initiative led by the national research labs. It should also enhance DoD’s testing and evaluation capabilities as AI-enabled systems grow in number, scope, and complexity. Senior-level responsible AI leads should be appointed across the government to improve executive leadership and policy oversight. 
Present a democratic model of AI use for national security. AI tools are critical for U.S. intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement agencies. Public trust will hinge on justified assurance that government use of AI will respect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. The government must earn that trust and ensure that its use of AI tools is effective, legitimate, and lawful. This imperative calls for developing AI tools to enhance oversight and auditing, increasing public transparency about AI use, and building AI systems that advance the goals of privacy preservation and fairness. It also requires ensuring that those impacted by government actions involving AI can seek redress and have due process. The government should strengthen oversight and governance mechanisms and establish a task force to assess evolving concerns about AI and privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. 

Part II: Winning the Technology Competition. 
The race to research, develop, and deploy AI and associated technologies is intensifying the technology competition that underpins a wider strategic competition. China is organized, resourced, and determined to win this contest. The United States retains advantages in critical areas, but current trends are concerning. While a competitive response is complicated by deep academic and commercial interconnections, the United States must do what it takes to retain its innovation leadership and position in the world. The U.S. government must embrace the AI competition and organize to win it by orchestrating and aligning U.S. strengths. 
Win the global talent competition. The United States risks losing the global competition for scarce AI expertise if it does not cultivate more potential talent at home and recruit and retain more existing talent from abroad. The United States must move aggressively on both fronts. Congress should pass a National Defense Education Act II to address deficiencies across the American educational system—from K-12 and job reskilling to investing in thousands of undergraduate- and graduate-level fellowships in fields critical to the AI future. At the same time, Congress should pursue a comprehensive immigration strategy for highly skilled immigrants to encourage more AI talent to study, work, and remain in the United States through new incentives and visa, green card, and job-portability reforms. 
Accelerate AI innovation at home. The government must make major new investments in AI R&D and establish a national AI research infrastructure that democratizes access to the resources that fuel AI development across the nation. The government should: (1) double non-defense funding for AI R&D annually to reach $32 billion per year by 2026, establish a National Technology Foundation, and triple the number of National AI Research Institutes; (2) establish a National AI Research Infrastructure composed of cloud computing resources, test beds, large-scale open training data, and an open knowledge network that will broaden access to AI and support experimentation in new fields of science and engineering; and (3) strengthen commercial competitiveness by creating markets for AI and by forming a network of regional innovation clusters. 
Implement comprehensive intellectual property (IP) policies and regimes. The United States must recognize IP policy as a national security priority critical for preserving America’s leadership in AI and emerging technologies. This is especially important in light of China’s efforts to leverage and exploit IP policies. The United States lacks the comprehensive IP policies it needs for the AI era and is hindered by legal uncertainties in current U.S. patent eligibility and patentability doctrine. The U.S. government needs a plan to reform IP policies and regimes in ways that are designed to further national security priorities. 
Build a resilient domestic base for designing and fabricating microelectronics. After decades leading the microelectronics industry, the United States is now almost entirely reliant on foreign sources for production of the cutting-edge semiconductors that power all the AI algorithms critical for defense systems and everything else. Put simply: the U.S. supply chain for advanced chips is at risk without concerted government action. Rebuilding domestic chip manufacturing will be expensive, but the time to act is now. The United States should commit to a strategy to stay at least two generations ahead of China in state-of-the-art microelectronics and commit the funding and incentives to maintain multiple sources of cutting-edge microelectronics fabrication in the United States. 
Protect America’s technology advantages. As the margin of U.S. technological advantage narrows and foreign efforts to acquire American know-how and dual-use technologies increase, the United States must re-examine how to best protect ideas, technology, and companies without unduly hindering innovation. The United States must: 
First, modernize export controls and foreign investment screening to better protect critical dual-use technologies—including by building regulatory capacity and fully implementing recent legislative reforms, implementing coordinated export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with allies, and expanding disclosure requirements for investors from competitor nations. Second, protect the U.S. research enterprise as a national asset—by providing government agencies, law enforcement, and research institutions with tools and resources to conduct nuanced risk assessments and share information on specific threats and tactics, coordinating research protection efforts with allies and partners, bolstering cybersecurity support for research institutions, and strengthening visa vetting to limit problematic research collaborations. 
Build a favourable international technology order. The United States must work hand-in- hand with allies and partners to promote the use of emerging technologies to strengthen democratic norms and values, coordinate policies and investments to advance global adoption of digital infrastructure and technologies, defend the integrity of international technical standards, cooperate to advance AI innovation, and share practices and resources to defend against malign uses of technology and the influence of authoritarian states in democratic societies. The United States should lead an Emerging Technology Coalition to achieve these goals and establish a Multilateral AI Research Institute to enhance the United States’ position as a global research hub for emerging technology. The Department of State should be reoriented, reorganized, and resourced to lead diplomacy in emerging technologies. 
Win the associated technologies competitions. Leadership in AI is necessary but not sufficient for overall U.S. technological leadership. AI sits at the center of the constellation of emerging technologies, enabling some and enabled by others. The United States must therefore develop a single, authoritative list of the technologies that will underpin national competitiveness in the 21st century and take bold action to catalyze U.S. leadership in AI, microelectronics, biotechnology, quantum computing, 5G, robotics and autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, and energy storage technology. U.S. leadership across these technologies requires investing in specific platforms that will enable transformational breakthroughs and building vibrant domestic manufacturing ecosystems in each. At the same time, the government will need to continuously identify and prioritize emerging technologies farther over the horizon. 

Bangladesh National Security Council- Advisory Board 
GoB is in the process of executing a formal National Security Council. The GoB machinery is working on the charting of modalities on legislation, administration, strategy-goal, and proposed organisation structure and manpower and other logistics including the Budget. The comparative information of United Kingdom, United States, India and Israel have been provided here to have a background. All these information suggest that there should be and Advisory Board to the Bangladesh National Security Council- in the form Think Tank to work as a Search Engine Performing  Research Study  on issues relevant to National Security. This group will pursue research study based on priority agenda of Main Body of National Security Council formed in line with legislative procedure applying their respective expertise by using neutral  thought process.  This advisory committee may be of 7 or 9 members in combination of expertise with Defense, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Fundametalism, Economics-Trade-Banking-Tax, Religious leaders, Political Scientists-Sociologists, Psychologists, Legal Expert, and Information Technologist-Cyber Security Expert. This committee will prepare agenda to continue research work based on short-term; medium term and long-term projects. The advisory committee may hold monthly meeting and after two months they will appraise the Chairman of National Security Council at two months interval or based on the gravity of the emerging situation. Based on the justifiable ground, the advisory committee may be allowed to outsource the expertise. Specially, the recent rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, Bangladesh with the legacy of Religious Fundamentalist Forces with Weaponry, Capturing the Financial might is a great threat to Secular Democracy.

Jamaluddin Ahmed PhD FCA is the General Secretary of Bangladesh Economic Association, Former member of Board of Directors of Bangladesh Bank, Former Chairman of the Board of Directors of Janata Bank Limited and Former President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh.